

Christopher B. Kulp
Professor of Philosophy
Ph.D., Vanderbilt University, 1986
(Very) Short *Curriculum Vitae*

Philosophical Interests:

Specialization: Epistemology, Metaethics, Moral Epistemology

Teaching Interests: American Pragmatism, Analytic Philosophy, Logic, Metaphysics, Normative and Applied Ethics

Selected Recent Publications, Presentations, and Major Works in Progress:

Books:

Non-Naturalist Moral Realism: A Metaphysical and Epistemological Defense. This book, the fourth in a projected quadrilogy on metaethics and moral epistemology, is currently being written. It is a research monograph that will present a full-scale defense of the non-naturalist moral realism and broadly rationalist moral epistemology developed in the preceding three books in the series.

Varieties of Moral Knowledge. Currently under review for publication: 96,000+ words. This is a research monograph on moral epistemology, which presents a detailed development of an anti-skeptical, moral realist theory of moral knowledge. It is the third book in a projected quadrilogy on metaethics and moral epistemology (the first two books were published in 2017 and 2019: see below).

Metaphysics of Morality. Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. A research monograph on metaethics. The book provides a critique of the leading versions of moral antirealism, and develops a new non-naturalist theory of moral realism—roughly, the view that there are moral truths, moral facts, and moral properties that are objective, i.e., not social constructs.

Knowing Moral Truth: A Theory of Metaethics and Moral Knowledge. Lexington Books/Rowman & Littlefield, 2017. A research monograph on metaethics and moral epistemology. The book develops (i) a realist theory of moral truth, moral facts, and moral properties, and (ii) an intuitionist, fallibilist, foundationalist theory of justified moral belief and knowledge.

Articles, etc.

“Why Moral Objectivity?” Opening invited address at “The Objectivity of Morality: A Workshop in Metaethics,” sponsored by the Institute for Christian Philosophy at the University of Innsbruck, Austria, in acknowledgment of my work in metaethics: May 7, 2025.

“Moral Properties as the Foundation of Moral Objectivity.” My second address at “The Objectivity of Morality: A Workshop in Metaethics,” held at the University of Innsbruck, Austria: May 8, 2025.

“Comment on Caleb Perl, ‘Justifying Thresholds’.” An invited commentary on Perl’s conference paper, presented at the Notre Dame-ACU International Ethics Conference, held at the University of Notre Dame: April 10-12, 2022.

“The Role and Reliability of Moral Intuitions.” Invited online talk for the University of Innsbruck, Austria, Philosophy Department: March 16, 2022.

“Moral Intuitions: Seeming or Believing?” *Synthese*, Online First, April, 2022; print journal, Vol. 200, Issue 2 (April, 2022).

Note: An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Australian Catholic University International Conference on Moral Epistemology, Melbourne, Australia, May 31-June 2, 2018.

“On Peels on Doxastic Responsibility,” *Teorema*, Vol. XXXVII/2, 2018, pp. 111-126.

“Disagreement and the Defensibility of Moral Intuitionism,” *International Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 56, No. 4, Issue 224 (December, 2016): pp. 487-502.

Note: An earlier version of this paper was presented as an invited paper at an international philosophy conference, “New Moral Intuitionism: Its Possibilities and Challenges,” at the University of Gdansk, Poland: June, 2014.

“The Pre-Theoreticality of Moral Intuitions,” *Synthese*: October, 2014, Volume 191, Issue 15, pp. 3759-3778.

“Moral Facts and the Centrality of Intuitions,” *The New Intuitionism*, \ed. Jill Graper Hernandez (Continuum: 2011): 48-66.